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SANCTIFICATION, SATISFACTION,
AND THE PURPOSE OF PURGATORY
Neal Judisch

Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the doctrine of purgatory
among Christian philosophers. Some of these philosophers argue for the existence of purgatory from principles consistent with historic Protestant theology and then attempt, on the basis of those principles, to formulate a distinctively Protestant view of purgatory—i.e., one that differs essentially from
the Catholic doctrine as regards purgatory’s raison d’etre. Here I aim to show
that Protestant models of purgatory which are grounded in the necessity of
becoming fully sanctified before entering heaven (Sanctification Models) fail to
contrast materially with the Catholic model of purgatory, which has historically been formulated in terms of the necessity of making satisfaction for sins
already forgiven (The Satisfaction Model). Indeed, I shall argue that contrary to
widespread assumption, the Sanctification Model and the Satisfaction Model
are equivalent when the latter is properly understood.

Purgatory is the process of purification for those who die
in the love of God but who are not completely imbued
with that love. Sacred Scripture teaches us that we must be
purified if we are to enter into perfect and complete union
with God. Jesus Christ, who became the perfect expiation
for our sins and took upon himself the punishment that
was our due, brings us God’s mercy and love. But before
we enter into God’s Kingdom every trace of sin within us
must be eliminated, every imperfection in our soul must be
corrected. This is exactly what takes place in Purgatory.
—John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 4 August 1999
A man is punished by the very things through which he sins.
—Wis 11.16

I. Introduction
Among the few encouraging developments on the ecumenical frontier
in recent years is the noteworthy warming of Protestant sensibilities to
the idea of purgatory, understood as an intermediate postmortem state in
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which souls destined for heaven are purified or made fit for heavenly life.1
Belief in purgatory has of course been a mainstay of Catholic (but not of
Protestant) theology for centuries, and Catholics, true to form, are none
too likely to give it up. So to the extent that Catholics and Protestants can
manage to achieve agreement on the reality of an intermediate purgatorial
state, this achievement may be welcomed by the ecumenically-minded as
a piece of genuine progress.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that the arguments for purgatory which have been advanced by at least some Protestants who affirm its
existence make clear how little this otherwise encouraging development
must result from any authentic increase in appreciation as to where the
relevant points of disagreement (and agreement) between Catholics and
Protestants actually lie. Specifically, it is clear that the arguments in question were formulated with the express intent of avoiding certain perceived
errors and abuses which have long been associated with the Catholic theory
of purgatory—theological muddles which, according to these Protestant
purgatory proponents, supply the Catholic doctrine of purgatory with its
theoretical underpinning and motivational force—but which in fact betray
a misconception of what the Catholic theory is. On this view of things, the
Catholic doctrine had its genesis and finds its nourishment in a conception
of salvation according to which a person is put right with God more or less
as a result of their own good works and meritorious efforts, in contrast to
the Protestant view which specifies that a person’s right standing before
God is entirely a matter of grace, gratuitously applied to the individual
who puts his faith in the meritorious achievements of Christ. This perceived difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is then carried
over and reflected in the function assigned to purgatory, or the purpose it
is thought to serve, within these contrasting soteriological schemes: on the
Protestant version purgatory exists so that the heaven-bound individual
who requires postmortem sanctification may complete the process of being made intrinsically holy (as distinguished from being ‘reckoned’ holy
before the divine tribunal on account of an imputed righteousness not
inherently possessed) prior to entering into the glories of heaven, whereas
the Catholic version has it that the heaven-bound individual who has not,
at the time of death, made up for all the debts he has accumulated through
his sins must suffer postmortem punishment with a view toward making
satisfaction for them; this individual may then “enter into the joy of his
Lord” (Matthew 25.21), but only after his Lord, by way of preparation for
the joyous homecoming, has exacted an appropriately agonizing amount
of vengeance upon him for a suitable stretch of time.
1
See Justin D. Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” Faith
and Philosophy 24 (2007), pp. 311–330; David Vander Laan, “The Sanctification Argument for Purgatory,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), pp. 331–339; Jerry Walls,
Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford UP, 2002), and Hell: The Logic of
Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1992); David Brown, “No Heaven
Without Purgatory,” Religious Studies 21 (1985), pp. 447–456; and John Hick, Death
and Eternal Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). C. S. Lewis’s discussion of purgatory, in his Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer (Harcourt Brace & Co, 1964), pp.
106–111, is also frequently cited in this connection.
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Such appears to be the general picture. So, to take a recent example
from this Journal, one philosopher who operates within the mindset just
described contends that the difference between his view of purgatory,
which is targeted at the completion of the sanctification process, and the
Catholic view, which focuses on satisfaction for sins, is that the former
“is forward looking in that its purpose is to provide an occasion for the
fulfillment of a future aim” (viz. intrinsic, personal holiness), whereas the
latter “is backward-looking as its purpose is to provide an occasion for the
remission of past failures.”2 To put it in other terms, the Protestant version
is aimed at ‘purging’ the “disposition to sin” which remains in the incompletely sanctified believer even though the penalty for his sins was paid in
toto by Christ, while the Catholic version is aimed at ‘purging’ “the penalty
for sin or sin itself” as opposed to the sinful disposition.3 This difference
of purpose is then understood, in turn, to be an inevitable outworking of
the fundamentally contrastive soteriological orientations of Catholicism
and Protestantism: in effect, Protestants think that Jesus paid the penalty
for our sins, but Catholics don’t think that. Accordingly, it’s no surprise
that since the Catholic view of purgatory requires the individual to make
satisfaction for his own failures, it “undermines the sufficiency of Christ’s
work as a satisfaction for sin” and indeed “renders Christ’s work superfluous,” whereas the “Sanctification Model of purgatory does not undermine
the sufficiency of Christ’s work as a satisfaction for sin” and therefore “alleviates at least one standard objection that Protestants might have against
purgatory.”4 Thus reassured, Protestants may in good faith avail themselves of the notion of purgatory and all the theoretical benefits pertaining
thereto, for even if the Catholic view of purgatory is “fundamentally incompatible with Protestantism” as regards the sufficiency (and, it would
seem, the overall non-superfluity) of Christ’s atoning sacrifice, it doesn’t
follow that every version of purgatory likewise renders “Christ’s salvific
work pointless”5 or otherwise conflicts with any given “cornerstone of
Protestant theology.”6
It seems to me reasonably safe to infer from remarks like these that
whatever exactly a Protestant / Catholic consensus on the existence of purgatory might suggest in the abstract, in this case it appears to represent
nothing more than the mutual affirmation of a comparatively tangential
doctrine to which both parties have arrived in wildly different ways and
for irreconcilably opposed reasons. Thus the real agreement concerning
the necessity of purgatory (for at least a large class of individuals) turns
out simply to highlight the radical underlying rift between Catholic and
Protestant thought generally, a rift which looks to remain as unbridgeable
as ever. In this essay I would like to make one very small contribution to
the ecumenical effort by showing that the Protestant version of purgatory
just introduced is equivalent to the Catholic one. For ease of reference I
Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 326.
Ibid., p. 326, my emphasis.
4
Ibid., pp. 326–327.
5
Ibid., p. 325.
6
Ibid., p. 329, n. 7.
2
3
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shall continue to refer to the Protestant conception and the Catholic conception as the Sanctification Model and the Satisfaction Model respectively. Thus my thesis may be rephrased as expressing the contention that
the Satisfaction Model and the Sanctification Model amount to the same
thing, so long as the Satisfaction Model is appropriately understood. To
put it another, slightly less ambitious-sounding way, I aim to show that
the Catholic doctrine of purgatory not only permissibly can but in fact
should be understood as equivalent to the Sanctification Model of purgatory. Whether every individual Catholic over the past two millennia has
understood the doctrine in precisely this way is, of course, another matter
entirely; but so far as I can see the answer to this question (which is almost
certainly “No”) is neither here nor there. For present purposes I shall simply take my cues from the official teaching of the Catholic Church and—to
allay any suspicions that my own interpretation of the Catholic position
is sneaky or idiosyncratic or excessively charitable or just plain “made
up”—I shall also appeal periodically to figures who can reasonably be
regarded as possessing a measure of representational authority within the
world of Catholicism. (Popes, for instance.) I begin with what I take to be
the common ground between Christians, of whatever stripe, who believe
in the reality of purgatory.
II. Why Purgatory?
Answers to this question vary, but the common thread running throughout the range of available responses is simply that (i) gracious pardon for
sins notwithstanding, we cannot enter into and enjoy full union with God
without being completely and finally liberated from the influence or ‘dominion’ of sin and made intrinsically pure and unwaveringly upright of
heart; yet (ii) hardly anybody we’ve heard of ever attains that degree of
holiness before they die and frankly, to judge by the look of things, we
probably aren’t going to either; but since (iii) God cannot simply ‘zap’ us
with a sanctifying ray and unilaterally bestow a radically altered nature
upon us all in one go, it had better be the case that (iv) there is some kind of
postmortem process, or state of being, whereby we are at last transformed
into the sorts of creatures who can enter into and ceaselessly celebrate that
perfect and eternal union with God held out to us in the life of the world
to come.
Some readers will no doubt wish to see a fuller defense of the assumption
in (iii); why can’t God unilaterally perfect us at the point of death, making
up for what we lack in the way of sanctification by sheer divine fiat? And
here again the reasons provided vary. According to some philosophers,
an externally imposed operation which consists in the instant and irrevocable transformation of our natures to the level of perfection required for
heavenly life would simply be too profound and sudden a change for any
of us to survive. Maybe it isn’t such a stretch to imagine St Francis getting
through the ordeal more or less intact, but the rest of us would hardly
recognize ourselves. And the intuition here is that we wouldn’t recognize
ourselves because we wouldn’t be ourselves: the medicine couldn’t come
in that heavy a dose without killing the patient, so to speak, so not even
God could renovate us so radically in one fell swoop and simultaneously
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preserve the sort of continuity required for personal identity through the
envisioned metamorphosis.7 Others contend that even if such externally
induced sanctification could occur without God’s violating a person’s persistence conditions, there must be morally sufficient reasons for Him not to
do it. For if we concede that God could carry out this kind of operation at
the point of death without contravening any moral principles or preventing any valuable state of affairs which would otherwise have obtained,
then we have to face the question why God doesn’t just perform this feat
right now, right here in this life. Yet (so the argument runs) to the extent that we cannot answer this question, we compromise our strategic
posture vis-à-vis the argument from evil, since if God could unilaterally
sanctify us at death without preventing any greater good—say, the good of
a gradually sanctified nature brought about through the cooperative interplay between divine grace and significant human freedom—then there’s
no obvious reason why He couldn’t eliminate all the post-conversion evil
we bring about by just cutting to the chase and unilaterally sanctifying
us here and now. So if God could do this but refrained from doing it,
He’d be guilty of allowing all sorts of evil which could be “properly eliminated,” or which He could prevent without introducing a greater evil or
averting a greater good, in which case we’d have no reply to the atheist’s
insistence that this is exactly what God would do if He really were everything traditional theism imagines Him to be.8 And finally, in a similar
vein, others have argued that any teleological theodicy which stresses the
process of growth towards a moral and spiritual ideal as being essential to
the genuine realization of this ideal (John Hick’s ‘soul-making’ approach
is an example) must likewise have recourse to a purgatorial state, since
an impeccably sanctified character bestowed from without at the time of
death, as opposed to an increasingly sanctified character which continues
to be developed after death from within, would short-circuit the authentic
maturation of the soul and therefore undermine the justification for evil
proposed by the theodicy.9

7
This is the argument advanced by David Brown in “No Heaven Without Purgatory.”
8
Justin Barnard formulates this argument in “Purgatory and the Dilemma of
Sanctification.”
9
Thus according to Michael Stoeber, unless we are prepared to endorse the twin
theses of karma and retributive rebirth as set forth in the Hindu tradition (which
Stoeber himself considers to be the wisest course), then we must instead appeal
to a purgatorial realm, understood as a state in which the unfinished growth
and maturation of the individual may be remedied. Such a state, he argues, is “a
necessary supposition of teleological theodicy” when we reflect on the suffering
and death of innocent children in particular, for if “the tortured child is removed
from the teleological scheme without the chance to realise the telos that justifies
moral and natural evils of the world, then that theodicy fails. To suggest that the
child simply passes away is to deny divine goodness. To suppose that the child is
granted eternal life is to render divine providence arbitrary or elitist. And, in any
case, both proposals imply that evil cannot be fully explained in terms of the teleology” (Evil and the Mystic’s God: Towards a Mystical Theodicy [University of Toronto
Press, 1992], p. 169). See also John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Harper, 1978).
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On the whole I think each of these arguments for (iii) has something
to commend it. Since my aim here is less to establish purgatory’s existence and more to reconcile two allegedly rival conceptions of it, however, I shall forego any detailed discussion of them and take the reality
of purgatory for granted. Supposing then we grant arguendo that belief
in purgatory is sufficiently well motivated for Catholics and Protestants
alike, we should take a moment to make explicit the function assigned
to purgatory according to (iv); and to this end it will be useful to borrow
two terms10 from Justin Barnard, the philosopher upon whom I relied
to represent the Sanctification Model approach above. Let us say that a
person S is ‘lapsable’ iff S possesses saving faith11 in Christ and S does
not (yet) possess a thoroughly sanctified nature; and let’s call a person S
‘sanctified’ iff S possesses saving faith in Christ and also possesses a thoroughly sanctified nature. To say that S possesses a thoroughly sanctified
nature is to say that S cannot sin, that S’s character and dispositions are
‘fixed’ in such a way that under no nomologically possible circumstances
would S commit evil. Putting the same thing more positively, S’s will is
one in purpose and holiness with the will of God. His character exemplifies the quality medieval theologians termed impeccability, the characteristic feature of the redeemed in heaven who, according to St Augustine,
have attained to that “truer” and “superior” kind of freedom (modeled
upon God’s) which involves both the ability to not sin—an ability we
haven’t really enjoyed since Adam’s fall—and the inability to sin—an inability we’ve never enjoyed at all.12 Thus the sanctified may be thought
of as possessing a kind of moral libertas which mirrors the divine freedom, a state of being which St Augustine construes as a heavenly reward,
whereas the lapsable are destined to but have not yet attained this moral
perfection of their natures.
So finally, with all this in place, we can say that the exclusive object of
purgatory according to the Sanctification Model is the transformation of the
lapsable into the sanctified: by itself, saving faith is necessary for getting into
purgatory and sufficient for avoiding hell; being lapsable is necessary and
sufficient for getting into purgatory; and being sanctified is necessary and
sufficient for getting out of purgatory (or in rare cases just skipping it altogether) and getting into heaven. Purgation is thus the means by which the
Christian’s inherent moral condition “catches up” to his unpenalizable status,
purchased by Christ, before the tribunal of God. That is what the Sanctification Model says.
Actually, two more. I have borrowed ‘Sanctification Model’ and ‘Satisfaction
Model’ from him as well.
11
Here I understand ‘saving faith’ to be whatever sort of faith it is that distinguishes the elect from those devils who “believe and tremble” (Jas 2.19). I take it
that such faith is identical to the ‘faith working through love’ (fides quae per dilectionem operatur) of which St Augustine spoke in his On Grace and Free Will 18–20, but
nothing in my argument hangs on this particular formulation of it.
12
See St Augustine, City of God XXII.30. For a very enjoyable overview of the
medieval discussion concerning the freedom and impeccability of the saints, see
Simon Francis Gaine, Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom, Impeccability and
Beautitude (T&T Clark: Continuum, 2003).
10
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III. Sins and Satisfactions
We know, then, that there is nothing sinful about the sanctified as regards
their characters or dispositions: they love God and neighbor with all their
hearts as a matter of routine. And since Jesus made satisfaction for the
sins they had committed prior to becoming sanctified, there is nothing
‘categorically’ or ‘legally’ bad about them either, in the sense that they bear
no guilt for all the wrongs they have done and are in consequence subject
to no retributive punishment. Now the Satisfaction Model of purgatory as
sketched above is consistent with this description of those who have gone
through purgatory as being both inherently and legally upright—as having been ‘purged’ both of the “disposition to sin” and of “the penalty for sin
or sin itself”—but even if the end result of purgation on the Satisfaction
Model is consistent with the ultimate result according to the Sanctification
Model, the purpose of purgation on the Satisfaction approach evidently
isn’t the “forward looking” one of producing sanctified individuals, but
appears primarily to involve the “backward looking” aspect of meting out
retributive punishments and penalties for the wrongs they have done.
Indeed, when we reflect that Barnard’s description of the Satisfaction
Model fails to include the suggestion that any sanctification might be taking place in purgatory at all, it is tempting to conclude that the latter aspect
(the retributive punishment bit) is really the main point, maybe even the
sole point, of purgatory on a Catholic view of things. Thus Barnard: “According to the Satisfaction Model, purgatory is a temporal state of existence
after death the purpose of which is to make satisfaction (i.e., payment) for
sins committed on earth for which sufficient satisfaction was not rendered
by the time of death.”13 Nor is the assumption Barnard voices here peculiar
to him. For example, after quoting the relevant portion from the Council
of Florence (1439), which specifies that “if truly penitent people die in the
love of God before they have made satisfaction for acts and omissions by
worthy fruits of repentance, their souls are cleansed after death by cleansing pains,”14 Michael Stoeber concludes,
From the official Vatican standpoint, then, purgatory is understood
as a realm of physical or mental punishment, more in negative terms
of painful retribution than in positive conceptions of spiritual learning and growth. Indeed, though the latter function is not ruled out in
the traditional formulation, there is the sense that one can ‘burn off,’
as it were, the actions and effects of past moral improprieties, simply
through passive suffering.15
And the mere passive suffering of painful retribution, of course, hardly
suggests that any spiritual learning and growth are in view here at all;
what it does appear to suggest, and what it has strongly suggested to Barnard at any rate, is that Calvin’s classification of the Catholic conception
of purgatory as a “horrid blasphemy” and a “deadly device of Satan”
Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 325.
Ecumenical Council of Florence, Session 6.
15
Stoeber, Evil and the Mystic’s God, p. 167.
13
14
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“seems fitting from the perspective of Protestant theology,” inasmuch as
Protestant theology protests that Christ’s satisfaction for sin isn’t simply
empty or fictitious.16
Over against this assessment of the Catholic position stands the Catholic position’s assessment of itself. And as far as I can tell, this latter assessment makes it tolerably clear that the “official Vatican standpoint” is
similar indeed to the official Barnardian one. In a nutshell, the Catholic
doctrine says that (1) the sins of Christians have been forgiven in virtue of
the satisfaction rendered for them by Christ, and that (2) as a consequence,
they will not suffer ‘eternal punishment’ for their sins. It then adds to this
the provisos that (3) insofar as there remain ‘temporal punishments’ attached to sins for which these Christians themselves must ‘make satisfaction,’ it follows that (4) if they have not ‘made satisfaction’ for these sins
prior to death then they’ve got to go through purgatory. Now when the
Catholic doctrine says all this, the statements in (1) and (2) should be taken
as stating that Christians will suffer no ‘legal’ penalty for their sins because
Christ took the punishment for those sins upon Himself so as to secure
their forgiveness, and the provisos in (3) and (4) should be understood as
specifying the need for lapsable Christians to undergo a purgative regimen
aimed at the rehabilitation or restoration of their spiritual health. That is, the
Catholic doctrine of purgatory says that purgatory is for Christians who,
despite the cancellation of their ‘legal’ penalties before God, still need to
become thoroughly sanctified.
Admittedly, the terminological devices involved in this formulation tend
to invite misgiving. But the juridical / legal language in which the doctrine is
cast is simply the characteristic mode of expression that the Western tradition, both Catholic and Protestant, has historically used to get across whatever it’s trying to say. Doubtless this mode of expression can be misleading
and at times does more harm than good (in fact the case before us seems a
promising candidate for one of those times), but however that may be there
is no question that the vision of purgatory expounded here is one with
which Protestants (and Eastern Orthodox, too) should be perfectly happy.17
To see this, however, one must first appreciate how terms like ‘satisfaction’
and ‘temporal punishment’ are being deployed by those who use them
to describe what’s going on in purgatory. And in order to get straight on
these terms, it is of first importance to recognize that according to Catholic
Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 326.
With respect to the proper interpretation of the Catholic dogma it is worth
bearing in mind, as Linda Zagzebski (“Purgatory,” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy [New York: Routledge, 1998], p. 838) has noted, that when the official
teaching on purgatory was first hammered out at the Councils of Lyons (1274)
and Florence (1439) it was done “with the intent of reconciling the Greek Christians,” who objected to much of what the legal and penal language in which the
dogma is formulated tends prima facie to suggest. Given that the Eastern Orthodox
mode of theological expression is much more ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ than ‘legal’ or
‘juridical’—e.g., salvation understood in terms of deification as opposed to justification, purgatory seen as a process of growth and maturation as opposed to satisfaction
and punishment, etc.—it seems reasonable to believe that the Catholic participants
would not lightly have aggravated Greek sensibilities with respect to the content of
the doctrine of purgatory being propounded.
16
17
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thought sin has a “double consequence” which corresponds to two distinct
kinds of punishment for sin. That is to say, a given sinful action or omission
must be thought of as resulting in two kinds of consequence, and corresponding to each kind of consequence is a particular form of punishment
appropriate to it. As regards the first consequence of sin—or, if you prefer,
the first aspect of the “double consequence” of sin; I take these expressions
to be synonymous—sin “deprives us of communion with God” which in
turn “makes us incapable of eternal life;” and the “privation” of eternal life
“is called the ‘eternal punishment’ of sin.”18 Thus we can see that the first
consequence of sin is to be identified with the deprivation of the sinner’s
communion with God, and the punishment attending this consequence of
sin is the sinner’s exclusion from eternal life: i.e., his consignment to the
eternal punishment of sin, or ‘hell.’ Now this ‘eternal punishment,’ which
is one of the two consequences of sin, should be understood as corresponding to what Barnard has in mind when he speaks of the “penalty for sin.”
In other words, this consequence of sin relates to the ‘legal’ debt we owe to
God and for which, as St Anselm insisted in Cur Deus Homo, only a person
who is both God and Man could make a satisfaction acceptable to divine
justice.19 It follows, then, that we ourselves cannot make satisfaction for
this consequence of sin (i.e., we cannot ‘purge’ the “penalty for sin or sin
itself”) on the Catholic view; for that is a work of Christ only. And when
we appropriate the satisfaction Christ made on our behalf by repenting
and putting our faith in Him we receive “forgiveness of sin and restoration of communion with God,” which, in consequence, releases us from the
obligation to pay the penalty for our sins and entails that we are no longer
deprived or “made incapable of” of eternal life.20
So far so good. But recall that there is a second consequence of sin in
addition to the one above. For although forgiveness of sins and restoration of communion with God together “entail the remission of the eternal
punishment of sin,” the “temporal punishment of sin remains”—and it is
of course the ‘temporal punishment’ for which we are expected to ‘make
satisfaction,’ either in this life or in the purgatorial fires of the next.21 Now,
this element of the current approach will likely be regarded as rendering the Satisfaction Model flatly and irredeemably incompatible with the
Sanctification Model, since it may easily sound as though it takes back
from us with one hand what it had given us with the other—Jesus made
satisfaction for sins, it assures us, but for some reason or other, it goes on
to say, we’ve got to make our own satisfaction anyhow; and that is precisely the suggestion proponents of the Sanctification Model are eager to
repudiate. Yet to charge the Satisfaction Model with doublespeak on this
point would be to ignore the fact that the ‘temporal punishment’ for sin
really does correspond to a distinct consequence of sin and that this consequence is entirely different from the first one, the one that corresponds to
the ‘eternal punishment’ of sin described above.
Catechism of the Catholic Church §1472, emphasis in original; cf. §§1849–1850.
St Anselm, Cur Deus Homo I.11–15, 19–25. Cf. St Thomas, Summa Theologica, III,
q. 48 art. 2, 4; q. 49 art. 3; q. 68 art. 5 and see also §§601–615 of the Catechism.
20
Catechism §1473.
21
Ibid.
18
19
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In reality, the second consequence of sin simply isn’t about legal ‘penalties’ which need to be ‘settled’ in the divine law court or accumulated
‘debts’ for which the sinner must make ‘payment’; nor is the ‘temporal
punishment’ corresponding to this consequence a matter of vindictive
‘retribution’ externally imposed by God the Judge upon hapless, passively suffering sinners; nor, finally, is the ‘satisfaction’ required of such
sinners a matter of accruing enough merit to balance out their demerits
or, alternatively, just gritting their teeth and letting God extract His pound
of flesh. Rather, the consequence of sin which issues in ‘temporal punishment’ is identical to the corrosive effect of sin itself upon the individual’s
soul; the ‘temporal punishment’ of this consequence, accordingly, consists
in the individual’s enduring through and struggling to rectify the disorder of
his soul and spiritual ill health that sinful behavior brings in its wake; and,
finally, ‘making satisfaction’ for sins, in this context, is to be understood as
the individual’s doing whatever is required (and allowing God to do to him
whatever’s required) to restore his spiritual well-being and so to be ‘purged’
of his self-destructive attachment to sin. To put it another way, sinfulness—the
self-reinforcing urge to commit iniquity introduced through original sin
and fostered by the habitual exercise of our capacity for it, or what the
tradition simply calls ‘concupiscence’—just is the second consequence of
sin, the ‘temporal punishment’ for which sinners must suffer here or in
purgatory. It is not some additional ‘judicial’ penalty God imposes on sinners from on high with the expectation of their finding a way, somehow or
other, to ‘make satisfaction’ in the form of ‘payment’ for their debts; it is, as
it were, the ‘natural’ punishment sin itself brings upon those who commit
it, rather as virtue is said to bring with it its own reward.
Once these clarifications are grasped and held firmly in mind, it should
be perfectly obvious that the model of purgatory expounded in the relevant sections of the Catechism of the Catholic Church is straightforwardly
equivalent to the Sanctification Model, not something that stands in sworn
opposition to it. Notice, for example, that it is precisely the “unhealthy
attachment to creatures” (i.e., a sinful disposition) which is said to result
from sin and issue in “temporal punishment” for it, and, moreover, that
purgatory is identified as the process by which the individual is purified
from such attachment:
To understand this doctrine and practice of the Church, it is necessary to understand that sin has a double consequence. Grave sin deprives us of communion with God and therefore makes us incapable
of eternal life, the privation of which is called the “eternal punishment” of sin. On the other hand every sin, even venial, entails an
unhealthy attachment to creatures, which must be purified either
here on earth, or after death in the state called Purgatory. This purification frees one from what is called the “temporal punishment”
of sin.22
Further, the notion that the ‘temporal punishment’ suffered in purgatory
is some sort of “backward looking” retribution God extracts from indiCatechism §1472, emphasis in original.

22
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viduals in view of their “past failures” is explicitly repudiated, since the
punishment in question “must not be conceived of as a kind of vengeance
inflicted by God from without, but as following from the very nature of
sin.”23 And it follows from the nature of sin because sin doesn’t only harm
the person against whom it is perpetrated or amass a whole ton of debt
before God or whatever, it “also injures and weakens the sinner himself,
as well as his relationships with God and neighbor”24 because it “creates
a proclivity to sin; it engenders vice by repetition of the same acts [and]
results in perverse inclinations which cloud conscience and corrupt the
concrete judgment of good and evil,” which in turn explains why “sin
tends to reproduce itself and reinforce itself.”25 Thus although “Absolution takes away sin”—i.e., although it removes what Barnard calls the
“penalty for sin or sin itself”—receiving this forgiveness “does not remedy
all the disorders sin has caused”—i.e., it doesn’t automatically eliminate
what Barnard calls the person’s “disposition to sin.” Consequently, once he
has been “Raised up from sin [i.e., forgiven], the sinner must still recover
his full spiritual health by doing something more to make amends for the
sin: he must ‘make satisfaction for’ or ‘expiate’ his sins,” an activity which
“is also called ‘penance.’”26 And if his “full spiritual health” hasn’t been
recovered by the time he dies, then he’s going to have to keep on ‘making
satisfaction’ and ‘doing penance’ right through the fires of purgatory until
he gets it back.
So all of this talk about “satisfaction” and “expiation” and “suffering”
and “penance” and the like does not refer to the poor soul’s attempt to appease the fury of God by offering itself up as an object of divine vengeance;
it is aimed precisely at the “forward looking” goal of the transformation of
the “old man” into the “new man”—in other words, at the conversion of
the lapsable into the sanctified:
The forgiveness of sin and restoration of communion with God entail
the remission of the eternal punishment of sin, but temporal punishment of sin remains. While patiently bearing sufferings and trials of
all kinds and, when the day comes, serenely facing death, the Christian must strive to accept this temporal punishment of sin as a grace.
He should strive by works of mercy and charity, as well as by prayer
Ibid.
Catechism §1459.
25
Catechism §1865.
26
Catechism §1459. Compare also St Thomas’s endorsement and explanation of
the definition of satisfaction according to which “satisfaction is to uproot the causes
of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof” in the Summa Theologica,
Supp. III, q. 12 art. 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province): “By ‘causes’ we
must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the
lust of sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things
which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of sin, such as
place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this
life, albeit the ‘fomes’ [i.e., the ‘fuel’ of concupiscence, the effect of original sin],
which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in
this life though it is weakened.”
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and the various practices of penance, to put off completely the “old
man” and to put on the “new man.”27
And this is why, finally, the kind of “conversion which proceeds from a
fervent charity can attain the complete purification of the sinner in such a
way that no punishment would remain,” since such a comprehensive and
profound perfection of the entire life’s effort toward conversio, or reorientation toward God and away from sin, signals the end “of the struggle . . .
directed toward holiness and eternal life” whereby the Christian “seeks
to purify himself of his sin and to become holy with the help of God’s
grace.”28 But to be purified and to become holy with the help of God’s
grace is of course equivalent to successfully consummating the sanctification process; and whenever that process has come to completion ‘temporal
punishment’ naturally has no further application, since the whole telos of
‘temporal punishment’ is to spur us onward toward precisely this goal.
Putting it all together, it follows that the exclusive object of purgatory according to the Satisfaction Model is to allow those who die in the love
of God to suffer the ‘temporal punishments’ and ‘make satisfaction’ for sins,
where this in turn is strictly equated with the process whereby the forgivenbut-lapsable individual is purified of his disposition to sin and made inherently
holy. Therefore, by itself saving faith is necessary for getting into purgatory
and sufficient for avoiding hell; being lapsable is necessary and sufficient
for getting into purgatory; and being sanctified is necessary and sufficient
for getting out of purgatory (or in rare cases simply giving it a pass) and
getting into heaven. In other words: the Satisfaction Model is equivalent
to the Sanctification Model.
There is a prettier and somewhat less cumbersome and distracting
way the same thing could be said. According to the Satisfaction Model
à la Pope Benedict XVI, for example, the tripartite division of hell, purgatory and heaven maps neatly onto what may be considered the three
potential spiritual states of an individual at death. At one extreme lies
the frightful possibility of persons who have “totally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to love” and “who have lived for hatred and
have suppressed all love within themselves” to the point that the destruction of the good within them is “irrevocable,” which leaves them simply
“beyond remedy.” That’s “what we mean by the word Hell.” At the other
extreme stand the sanctified, “who are utterly pure, completely permeated by God, and thus fully open to their neighbours—people for whom
communion with God even now gives direction to their entire being and
whose journey towards God only brings to fulfillment what they already
are.” This is the group of persons who populate heaven. And somewhere
in between these angels and demons are those who have “in the depths of
their being an ultimate interior openness to truth, to love, to God. In the
27
Catechism §1473. Also instructive in this connection is St Augustine’s distinction between the ‘remedial’ punishments of this life and of purgatory, suffered by
those who haven’t completely subdued their carnal desires prior to the final judgment, and the non-‘purgatorial’ or eternal punishments of the wicked following
the final judgment in hell; see City of God XXI.13, 15–16.
28
Catechism §1426, §1474.
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concrete choices of life, however, it is covered over by ever new compromises with evil—much filth covers purity, but the thirst for purity remains
and it still constantly re-emerges from all that is base and remains present
in the soul.” For this batch there is purgatory, an intermediate state in
which “purification and healing which mature the soul for communion
with God” takes place. It is a “fire” through which they must pass “so
as to become fully open to receiving God and able to take [their] place at
the table of the eternal marriage-feast,” where the “fire” in question is, at
its root, identical to the “gaze” and “the touch of [Christ’s] heart” which
“heals us through an undeniably painful transformation” but which, “as it
burns us, transforms and frees us, allowing us to become truly ourselves”
and “thus totally of God.”29 So, to put the conclusion reached above a bit
more inspiringly, purgatory is the purifying and transformative postmortem
encounter with Christ which takes the broken and sick and heals them, making
them fit to enjoy unsullied and unending communion with God and the saints in
the life everlasting. That is what the Satisfaction Model says.
IV. Objections and Replies
I would like in this section to consider three objections, not so much to the
Satisfaction Model itself, but rather to the suggestion that any Catholic
thinker prior to, say, the mid-twentieth century actually thought of purgatory that way. In a sense, of course, it doesn’t really make a difference,
since once the terminology is understood as I’ve argued it should be, the
model is easily seen to cohere with the terse and sketchy remarks about
purgatory codified in the relevant documents antedating our time, so
there isn’t any impediment to present-day Catholics accepting a position
on purgatory which is identical in content to the Protestant position. But
at least as regards my modest ecumenical hopes, it would still be nice to
demonstrate that the Satisfaction Model I have described doesn’t amount
to a shifty or disingenuous about-face on the part of contemporary Catholics who might simply be trying through a clever redefinition of terms to
distance themselves from the lurid ideas of their less sophisticated predecessors. Perhaps more importantly, it seems reasonable to suspect that
some of the practices and teachings related to the traditional doctrine of
purgatory—e.g., the granting of indulgences for departed souls—conflict
with what I’ve argued the point of purgatory really is on the Catholic approach. However, what I want to begin with is one difficulty for the Satisfaction Model which does not connect with any controversial praxis or
dogma but which is still worth pursuing because of its intrinsic interest. I
have in mind the contention, voiced by St Bonaventure and probably assumed by others, that souls in purgatory cannot sin.
The assumption is attractive: we don’t want souls in purgatory retrogressing but continuing onward and upward, perhaps fueled by
something akin to what Barnard terms the “internal momentum” which
carries them inexorably toward their final sanctification.30 Additionally,
the cessation of sin and continuous forward progression here imagined
Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Spe Salvi §§45–47.
Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 323.
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may be thought to provide a salutary, merciful assurance to souls in
purgatory that they’ll ultimately make it out on the right side of things,
that their eventual salvation is guaranteed. Indeed, this appears to be
the primary reason for which St Bonaventure insisted that souls in purgatory couldn’t sin, so as to controvert the suggestion that uncertainty
about their fate is one of the torments with which souls in purgatory are
afflicted.31 Still, the obvious worry is that if souls in purgatory cannot
sin, and if to be unable to sin is to be sanctified, and if to be sanctified is
sufficient for getting out of purgatory and into heaven, then we have a
contradiction on our hands. In particular, it looks as if the only business
a sanctified soul could have in purgatory would be to suffer retributive
pains for all the rotten things they had done in life, which runs against
what I’ve said the purpose of purgatory is supposed to be.
So what to say? It seems to me that a person in purgatory may have
certainty that he will ultimately be saved “as through fire” without its being the case that this certainty is grounded in introspective awareness of
his inability to sin, together with an abductive inference to the effect that
he must therefore be heaven-bound. (Why couldn’t God just relay his fate
before sending him off to get purged, as in Newman’s Dream of Gerontius?)
And I see no reason in the abstract why the trajectory of souls in purgatory
couldn’t be characterized by a continual “upward trend” even if there are
“dips” in the form of stumblings and sins, particularly sins of omission,
along the way. Still, there is some plausibility to the thesis that among the
helps God extends to people experiencing postmortem purgation is an
impressive type of divine grace, which involves inter alia preserving them
from falling into any further sin or “getting any worse.” But notice that
even if this comforting proposal is correct it does not conflict with the condition stipulating that souls in purgatory are not yet sanctified and thus
does not contradict the Satisfaction Model. For to be providentially preserved from sinning is not equivalent to possessing a sanctified nature. If S
possesses a sanctified nature, recall, it follows that conditionals of the form
See St Bonaventure’s remarks in St Roger Bellarmine, De Purgatorio IV, dist.
20, p. 1, a. 1, q. iv, as cited in the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on “Purgatory,” http://
www.newadvent.org/cathen/12575a.htm. The thought that purgatorial afflictions
include uncertainty as to the final deliverance of the soul is represented, for example, in St John of the Cross: “This is the reason why those who lie in purgatory
suffer great misgivings as to whether they will ever go forth from it and whether
their pains will ever be over. For, although they have the habit of the three theological virtues—faith, hope and charity—the present realization which they have
of their afflictions and of their deprivation of God allows them not to enjoy the
present blessing and consolation of these virtues. For although they are able to
realize that they have a great love for God . . . they cannot think that God loves
them or that they are worthy that He should do so; rather, as they see that they are
deprived of Him . . . they think that there is that in themselves which provides a
very good reason why they should with perfect justice be abhorred and cast out
by God forever. And thus, although the soul in this purgation is conscious that it
has a great love for God . . . yet this is no relief to it, but rather brings it greater
affliction . . . [when] it sees itself to be so wretched that it cannot believe that God
loves it . . . [and] is grieved to see in itself reasons for deserving to be cast out by
Him for Whom it has such great love and desire,” Dark Night of the Soul II.7, trans.
E. Allison Peers (New York: Image Doubleday, 1990), pp. 113–114.
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“If S were in situation C, S would not sin” are necessarily true, true in all
(nomologically) possible circumstances, whereas if S is simply preserved
by divine grace from sinning it could be that there are many possible situations such that S would freely sin in them.32 Those, on this hypothesis,
are the situations God sees to it S isn’t placed in while he’s working his
way through purgatory. Thus one could agree with St Bonaventure that it
isn’t possible for people in purgatory to sin while simultaneously holding
that nobody in purgatory is already sanctified, since there is an acceptable
sense in which both scenarios (the already-sanctified scenario and the special-grace scenario) support the proposition that individuals in purgatory
“cannot sin,” albeit in different ways.
Naturally, one wonders how genuinely conducive to spiritual fitness
purgatory could be if things were “rigged” so that the souls there could do
nothing at all to impede their own progress (even if they themselves might
not know they couldn’t do this), but it seems to me too quick to infer that
a purgatory like this couldn’t get the job done. To be sure, we may not be
as inclined to applaud purgatory graduates here as we would if we knew
there’d been a live possibility of regression or loss, and maybe we feel that
the soul’s progress wouldn’t be all that laudable unless God were to back
off a bit and let the soul more or less “go it alone.” But I think these intuitions tend to misdirect the judgment. For one thing, purgatory isn’t happily thought of as a ‘place’ for the acquisition of merit or the accumulation
of accolades and rewards; the point is rather rehabilitation and growth,
the eradication of dispositions to sin and the up-building and “setting” of
dispositions toward holiness instead. And it isn’t at all obvious why this
couldn’t take place unless God were prepared to disengage to the point of
allowing souls in purgatory to bring genuine harm upon themselves or
frustrate their own goals. Some analogies: the child’s father sees to it that
she uses training wheels at the outset, but she still learns how to ride; the
coach makes sure her gymnast invariably has someone around to spot
him, but he eventually works up strength and poise sufficient to perform
the acrobatics by himself; Barnum and Bailey insist that their neophyte
trapezist always be hooked up to a harness, but only so that she stays alive
and in one piece long enough to learn how to fly around the tent without
it. These are only analogies; but the point behind them is not inapplicable
to the case of interest.
So I see no reason to conclude that souls in purgatory couldn’t both be
lapsable and be kept by God from damaging themselves further through
fresh sin until they finally satisfy their temporal punishments and push
on. But however that issue should be settled there remains a more serious
question about the viability of my interpretation of the Satisfaction Model,
and that is the question of how the practice of granting indulgences for
the aid of souls in purgatory could be consistent with a view on which
purgation is aimed at sanctification, not at “paybacks.” Because here is
how things look: it looks as if the Pope is transferring a surplus of “merit”
the Church has “stored up” and applying it to souls in purgatory with
the intention of shortening their sentence or covering a portion of their
I note that the truth of this claim may depend upon the acceptance of Molinism. Thanks to Tom Flint for calling this to my attention.
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remaining debts, which wouldn’t make sense unless these souls are being
sent to purgatory for purely remunerative purposes after all. Now I have
no present interest in defending the Catholic doctrine of indulgences, still
less the unfortunate abuses for which this doctrine has provided occasion.
But since it is reasonably clear that the Satisfaction Model really does say
what I’ve said it does, and since it is equally clear that Catholics insist on
making room for indulgences nevertheless, charity demands contemplating the possibility that there is some way to understand the granting of
indulgences which renders it consistent with the Satisfaction Model.
As it happens one needn’t look far for the basic outlines of such an
understanding. To begin, if we grant the supposition that prayers offered
on another’s behalf can aid them in their sanctification while they are
alive, then, inasmuch as the ties which “knit and bind” believers together
in the “mystical body of Christ” cannot be broken by death, there is no
principled reason to suppose that Christians cannot pray for the dead
with the pious expectation that their prayers will make a difference to the
purgatorial progress of the dearly departed.33 This I take it is something
with which anyone who believes in purgatory, and who concedes the efficacy of prayer, could agree. But if obtaining indulgences on behalf of
the dead may be seen as an extension of the practice of praying for their
advancement in sanctification—if it’s motivated by the same convictions
and anticipates the same results—then it follows that there is a way of understanding indulgences which is consistent with the Satisfaction Model. I
am not, of course, claiming that anyone willing to countenance purgatory
or praying for the deceased should ipso facto look favorably upon indulgences, or even that they shouldn’t be hostile to the very idea of them. I am
claiming that if there is a consistent set S of ecclesiological-cum-theological
propositions such that S conjoined with the Satisfaction Model yields the
possibility of granting or obtaining efficacious indulgences for the dead,
then this practice is not inconsistent with the Satisfaction Model, regardless
of whether the propositions in S are true or whether they’re totally off the
mark. To rephrase, my interest here is in whether Catholic belief concerning indulgences contradicts my understanding of the Satisfaction Model
and thus disproves my contention that the theory of purgatory I’ve attributed to Catholicism is equivalent to the Sanctification Model; whether the
doctrine of indulgences is actually true (or for that matter whether there’s
actually a purgatory containing souls to be indulged in the first place) is a
question well beyond the scope of this paper.
In that spirit, then, consider Pope John Paul II’s explanation of the
Catholic Church’s indulgence-granting behavior. Note first that the conception of purgatory with which he operates is identical to the one I have
adumbrated above: the purpose of purgatory derives from the fact that
although the believer is already reconciled with God he still “must be
gradually ‘healed’ of the negative effects which sin has caused in him
33
And, for that matter, there’s no reason to think departed souls couldn’t return
the favor. So St Augustine, City of God XX.9. I realize of course that the efficacy of
petitionary prayer, (this understanding of) the communion of the saints, and the
existence of purgatory are all controversial assumptions. I myself am prepared to
accept them, but all I ask of my readers is to allow them for the sake of discussion.
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(what the theological tradition calls the ‘punishments’ and ‘remains’ of
sin)” prior to entering heaven, because communion with God requires
that every “imperfection of the soul must be corrected” by Christ, who
“removes from [souls in purgatory] the remnants of imperfection” in
preparation for their heavenly reception. Accordingly, as above, the ‘temporal punishment’ a person suffers in purgatory “serves as a ‘medicine’
to the extent that the person allows it to challenge him to undertake his
own profound conversion,” which is at bottom “the meaning of the ‘satisfaction’ required” of him before he attains to the beatific vision.34 With
this framework in place, the teaching on indulgences takes shape under
the following two assumptions. First there is the conviction, previously
voiced, that just “as in their earthly life believers are united in the one
Mystical Body, so after death those who live in a state of purification [i.e.,
purgatory] experience the same ecclesial solidarity” they enjoyed during
their tenure on earth, from which it follows that believers still undergoing their earthly pilgrimage may “offer up prayers and good works on
behalf of [their] brothers and sisters in Purgatory.”35 Second, there is the
(no doubt more contentious) belief that under certain carefully specified
conditions, the Church has the power to grant “a remission before God
of the temporal punishment due to sins whose guilt has already been
forgiven.” On this picture, then, the Church’s intercessory power makes
it possible to assist souls in purgatory by advancing their sanctification in
special, nonstandard ways, but nonetheless in ways that do not differ in
kind from praying for them, and thus do not involve anything on the order
of a forensic transaction absolving them of accumulated penalties or fines.
Here is John Paul II:
The Church has a treasury . . . which is “dispensed” as it were through
indulgences. This “distribution” should not be understood as a sort
of automatic transfer, as if we were speaking of “things.” It is instead
the expression of the Church’s full confidence of being heard by the
Father when . . . she asks him to mitigate or cancel the painful aspect
of punishment by fostering its medicinal aspect through other channels of grace. In the unfathomable mystery of divine wisdom, this
gift of intercession can also benefit the faithful departed, who receive
its fruits in a way appropriate to their condition. We can see, then,
how indulgences, far from being a sort of “discount” on the duty of
conversion, are instead an aid to its prompt generous and radical
fulfillment.36
Now whatever exactly one thinks about the distinctively Catholic ecclesiology underlying these claims, it is undeniably clear that insofar as these
ecclesiological claims are accepted there is no conflict between belief in the
efficacy of indulgences on the one hand and, on the other, the thesis that
purgatory’s exclusive purpose is to transform the lapsable into the sanctified. In
Pope John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 29 September 1999, §§2–3.
Pope John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 4 August 1999, §6.
36
Pope John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 29 September 1999, §4.
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other words, there is a way of understanding indulgences for the dead
(which, if John Paul II may serve as representative, isn’t too far removed
from how Catholics do understand indulgences) that is consistent with
the Satisfaction Model of purgatory as I’ve laid it out. Unquestionably, it
remains “unfathomably mysterious” how exactly the ‘medicinal’ feature
of temporal punishments is supposed to be administered through an alternative “channel of grace” which brings about the desired sanctifying
effect without the typical associated pains. But mystery isn’t equivalent to
inconsistency. And since my ambitions in this paper do not include trying
to eradicate mysteries like this one, I am satisfied with the result that, mysterious or no, the doctrine of indulgences does not undermine my claim
that the Satisfaction Model and the Sanctification Model may properly be
considered one and the same.
One final concern should be addressed. If the Satisfaction Model truly
is a “forward looking” theory oriented toward rehabilitation, sanctification and the like, what accounts for all the ideas about flames and torments and agonizing tortures and whatever else contributes to making the
atmosphere of purgatory generally unpleasant? Aren’t these assumptions
concerning how much it hurts to get ‘purged’ much easier to reconcile
with a view on which purgatory is more or less a temporary taste of hell,
a place for people to go if they do not quite deserve to be consigned to
the flames forever, but who do not deserve to pass into heaven entirely
unscathed? And doesn’t that suggest that my thesis is false, that the Satisfaction Model really is just about vindictive retributions after all?
Much could be said about the pain associated with purgation, and certainly much more than what I have the space37 to say it in. For the present,
then, I shall leave the task of responding to this question in the hands of St
Catherine of Genoa, whose suggestive remarks about the pains of purgatory (circa 1490, about 50 years after the Council of Florence) seem a fitting
way to pull together this article’s main themes:
The basis of all the pains [of purgatory] is sin, whether original or actual. God created the soul pure, simple and clean from all stain of sin,
with a beatific instinct towards the one from whom original sin, in
which the soul presently finds itself, draws it away. When actual sin
is added to this original sin, the soul is drawn still further from him.
. . . When a soul draws near to the pure and clear state in which it
was at its first creation, its beatific instinct is rediscovered and grows
continually stronger with such force that any obstacle preventing
the soul from finally reaching its goal appears to be unbearable. The
more it glimpses this vision, the greater its pain. Because the souls in
purgatory are without the guilt of sin, there is no obstacle between
them and God except their pain, which holds them back so that they
cannot reach perfection through this instinct. They can also see that
this instinct is held back by a need for righteousness. For this reason,
a fierce fire . . . comes into being, which is like that of Hell, with the
37
To say nothing of the competence; why “the flame of Everlasting Love / doth
burn ere it transform,” as Newman puts it, seems to me a question better left to
the mystics.
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exception of guilt. . . . And as for guilt, these souls are just as they
were when they were originally created by God, in that God forgives
immediately the guilt of those who have passed from this life distressed by their sins, and having confessed them and resolved not to
commit them anymore. Only the corrosion of sin is left, and they are
cleansed from this by pain in the fire. When they have been cleansed
for all guilt, and united in their wills with God, they may see him
clearly (to the extent that he makes himself known to them), and see
also how much it means to enjoy him, which is the goal for which
they have been created.38
If we take into account St Catherine’s insights, the painfulness of purgatory need not be taken as proof that its purpose on the Satisfaction Model
differs from the point of purgation on the Sanctification approach. Indeed,
St Catherine’s remarks make it abundantly clear that the Protestant version of purgatory recently put forward in this Journal has been anticipated
within the Catholic tradition centuries before this one, even if it has at
times been differently expressed. Therefore, neither the existence of purgatory nor the purpose behind it constitutes an authentic point of division
between Catholics and those Protestants who accept its reality.39
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St Catherine of Genoa, Treatise on Purgatory III.5, in The Christian Theology
Reader, ed. Alister McGrath (Blackwell: Oxford, 1995), p. 360.
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Thanks to Tom Flint and two anonymous referees for their helpful remarks on
a previous draft of this paper.

